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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action brought on behalf of Cape
Trust, the employees' pension and profit sharing trust for
Capitol Thrift & Loan, against Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, alleging that Commonwealth, acting as escrow
agent in the sale of residential subdivision lots, negligently misrepresented to Cape Trust, the assignee of the beneficial interest in certain of the lots covered by the escrow
agreement, the status of promissory notes and second trust
deeds on five of the subdivision lots.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, and resulted in a judgment against Commonwealth and in favor of plaintiff Richard A. Christenson as
trustee for Cape Trust as to plaintiff's claim for negligent
misrepresentation.

The lower court subsequently denied Com-

monwealth's post-trial motions for a new trial and/or to
alter and amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Early in 1977, AGLA Development Corporation ("AGLA") a
Salt Lake County based real estate developer, desired to develop a residential subdivision in Salt Lake County to be
named "Falconhurst No. l."

In connection with this develop-

ment, AGLA obtained construction financing through Western
Mortgage Loan Corporation in the amount of approximately
$450,000.00, and as security therefor granted Western Mortgage Loan Corporation a deed of trust on the undeveloped subdivision property.
At AGLA's request, defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") agreed to act as escrow
agent for the subdivision.

A copy of the escrow agreement

between AGLA and Commonwealth was introduced and received
into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The escrow agreement between AGLA and Commonwealth provided that as the individual subdivision lots were sold, Commonwealth would collect and remit 60% of the proceeds of each
sale to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation toward satisfaction
of the $450,000.00 obligation.

The escrow agreement provided

further that if the purchaser of a subdivision lot paid the
entire purchase price, Commonwealth would remit the remainder, after payment to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, to
AGLA or its assigns.

In the event the purchaser of a lot did

not pay the entire purchase price, the purchaser would execute a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the subdivision lot purchased.

The notes were to provide for pay-

ment of the balance of the purchase price in full within six
months, with interest accruing at 10% per annum until the
date due and 18% per annum thereafter.
Sometime in 1977 Capitol Thrift & Loan ("Capitol") made a
loan to AGLA for which AGLA assigned its beneficial interest
in the escrow agreement to Capitol as security (Tr. p. 32).
It should be pointed out that plaintiff Cape Trust is the
employee's pension and profit sharing trust for Capitol, and
that Capitol is Cape Trust's sole contributor.
As each lot was purchased during the period of time in
which Capitol held the beneficial interest in the escrow
agreement, Commonwealth, pursuant to the terms of the escrow
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agreement, paid 60% of the proceeds to Western Mortgage Loan
Corporation, and either remitted the remainder to Capitol or
had promissory notes secured by trust deeds in favor of Capitol executed by the purchasers for the remainder.
Under the arrangement outlined above, in October of 1977,
the five subdivision lots which are disputed in this action
were purchased by Irwin Custom Hornes, Inc.

Pursuant to the

terms of the escrow agreement, Irwin Custom Homes executed
promissory notes representing the balance of the purchase
price which was owed to AGLA or its assigns under the escrow
agreement.

These notes were secured by trust deeds on the

individual lots.

Certified copies of the trust deeds from

the Salt Lake County Recorder were introduced and received
into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit D-5.
On or about April 12, 1978, Irwin Custom Hornes, Inc.,
paid off the promissory notes on the five disputed trust
deeds.

Commonwealth then reconveyed the trust deeds (Defen-

dant's Exhibit D-5) and remitted $22,446.72 to Capitol, who
was at that time the assignee of AGLA's beneficial interest
in the escrow agreement.

A copy of the check from Common-

wealth to Capitol which indicates on its face that it represents "lot pay-offs" on the five disputed lots, and which is
dated April 12, 1978, was introduced and received into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4.
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Mr. Merlyn Hanks testified at trial that in his role as
an officer of Capitol, the check which indicated on its face
that it represented lot pay-offs on the five disputed subdivision lots would most likely have come to him to be negotiated (Tr. pp. 13, 33).

Capitol subsequently transferred

its interest in the escrow agreement back to AGLA, probably
because the obligation which was secured thereby had been
satisfied.
On October 4, 1978 AGLA assigned its beneficial interest
in twenty-five individual subdivision lots located in the
Falconhurst No. 1 subdivision and nine lots located in
another development called Falconhurst No. 2 subdivision, to
plaintiff Cape Trust, the employees' pension and profit sharing trust of Capitol.

The assignment, a copy of which was

introduced and received into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit
P-3 was prepared by Merlyn Hanks as trustee for Cape Trust
(Tr. p. 31).
Mr. Hanks testified that in preparing the assignment from
AGLA to Cape Trust he relied upon information supplied to him
by AGLA to determine which lots should be included in the
assignment (Tr. pp. 15-16, 17).

He testified that in the

preparation of the assignment he took no independent steps,
nor did he make any independent effort, to-determine the
status of the promissory notes or subdivision lots involved,

-5-
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and he admitted that at no time did Cape Trust or Capitol
keep a record of the promissory notes and trust deeds which
were being paid off and reconveyed (Tr. pp. 24, 34, 35-37).
Mr. Hanks testified that "in anticipation of" the assignment he talked with Mr. Ralph Ribas of Commonwealth over the
telephone prior to the execution of the assignment (Tr.
pp. 31-32).

During that telephone conversation specific pro-

missory notes and subdivision lots were not mentioned, nor,
according to Mr. Hanks' testimony, was there any representation by Mr. Ribas regarding the status of any of the notes
and subdivision lots (Tr. p. 32).
As discussed above, it turns out that five of the twentyfive subdivision lots in Falconhurst No. 1 subdivision
covered by the October 4, 1978 assignment from AGLA to Cape
Trust had already been sold to Irwin Custom Hornes, Inc., and
the beneficial interest in the trust deeds on those five lots
had been extinguished by the payment of the promissory notes
by Irwin Custom Hornes to Capitol and the reconveyance of the
trust deeds on April 12, 1978.
Cape trust's claim of misrepresentation against Commonwealth involves an "Acknolwedgernent" contained on the reverse
side of the October 4, 1978 Assignment from AGLA to Cape
Trust.

The Acknowledgment, which was prepared along with the

rest of the document by Mr. Merlyn Hanks, was signed by Ralph
Ribas of Commonwealth.

It provides:
-6-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company hereby
acknowledges receipt of an executed copy of the foregoing instrument and hereby promises its performance
to satisfy said agreement. Commonwealth Land Title
Insurance Company also agrees that it is in possession of the beneficial interest of promissory notes
and second trust deeds covering the above-mentioned
properties and that it will not convey its interest
in any way back to AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION or
any other entity not covered in the escrow agreement.
Cape Trust sued Commonwealth claiming that the Acknowledgment quoted above constituted an actionable misrepresentation by Commonwealth as to the status of the five disputed
subdivision lots.

Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that

the Acknowledgment signed by Commonwealth induced Cape Trust
to loan funds to, or for the benefit of, AGLA (Plaintiff's
Complaint, ,15).

However, Mr. Hanks testified at trial that

the assignment was made to Cape Trust to satisfy a debt owed
to Cape Trust by AGLA which arose out of an earlier joint
venture between the two parties (Tr. pp. 29-30).

Mr. Hanks

testified further that he did not know whether that preexisting debt was fully satisfied by the assignment (Tr.
pp. 11, 14-15}, and that the amount of debt so satisfied was
based upon some type of present value calculation, evidence
of which was not offered (Tr. pp. 18, 26, 30-31).
Mr. Hanks also testified that the amount of the preexisting debt forgiven by the assignment probably did not
equal the $21,680.00 prayed for in the complaint (Tr.

-7-
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p. 27).

No testimony or documentary evidence was offered by

plaintiff to establish the amount of debt so forgiven.
Despite the evidence summarized above, the trial court
found that Commonwealth had made affirmative representations
to Cape Trust regarding the status of the five disputed subdivision lots prior to the assignment from AGLA to Cape
Trust, which representations were confirmed by the Acknowledgment signed by Mr. Ralph Ribas on behalf of Commonwealth;
that Commonwealth knew that Cape Trust intended to rely upon
the representations and the Acknowledgment of Commonwealth;
that Cape Trust reasonably relied upon the representations
and the Acknowledgment of Commonwealth; that Cape Trust had
no knowledge of the fact that the five disputed notes had
been paid to Capitol and the second trust deeds securing the
notes thus reconveyed; and that the promissory notes on the
five disputed subdivision lots, which notes were not offered
as evidence, were for the total principal amount of
$21,680.00, together with interest for 6 months at 10% per
annum and thereafter at 18% per annum.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the trial court entered its Conclusions of Law that Commonwealth breached a
"special duty of care" which it owed to plaintiff by making
representations regarding the status of the five disputed
subdivision lots which it knew or should have known were
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false; that plaintiff was not required to do anything to verify the truth of the representations of Commonwealth, and
plaintiff was therefore in no way contributorily negligent;
and that the representations and Acknowledgment of Commonwealth materially influenced the actions of plaintiff Cape
Trust proximately causing plaintiff damages in the amount of
$21,680.00 together with interest at the rate of 10% per
annum from October 7, 1977 to April 7, 1978, and thereafter
at the rate of 18% until the date judgment was entered, and
thereafter at 12% per annum.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT COMMONWEALTH MADE AN AFFIRMATIVE REPRESENTATION TO CAPE TRUST REGARDING THE STATUS OF
THE FIVE DISPUTED SUBDIVISION LOTS.
A.
There was no evidence that Commonwealth
made any representation regarding the status of the
five disputed subdivision lots prior to the execution
of the October 4, 1978 Assignment and Acknowledgment.
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Commonwealth was based
upon a theory of misrepresentation.

To prevail upon such a

claim plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that an actual representation as to a material fact was made by
Commonwealth to plaintiff.
In this case the trial court found that such a representation had been made by Commonwealth to Cape Trust regarding the

-9-
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status of the five disputed subdivision lots.

However, the

record is devoid of evidence indicating that such a representation was actually made by Commonwealth.

Paragraph 7 of the

Findings of Fact entered by the trial court reads:
That the Acknowledgment confirmed in writing
the same agreements and representations that had
been previously made by Commonwealth to the
plaintiff.
Following the trial, the trial judge indicated that the
telephone conversation between Merlyn Hanks and Ralph Ribas
which was testified to by Mr. Hanks, contained the false representation concerning the status of the five disputed subdivision lots (Tr. p. 88).

The trial judge indicated his opinion

that the Acknowledgment signed by Mr. Ribas merely confirmed
the false representation earlier made on the telephone to Mr.
Hanks (Id.)
However, Mr. Ribas testified that he had no recollection of
any telephone conversation with Mr. Hanks which had anything to
do with the assignment of beneficial interests from AGLA to
Cape Trust (Tr. p. 65).

Further, Mr. Hanks testified that the

only telephone conversation which he recalled with Mr. Ribas
regarding this particular assignment of beneficial interests
was a very general one in which nothing was said by either of
the parties concerning any specific promissory notes, trust
deeds or subdivision lots (Tr. p. 31-32).

Thus, there was no
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evidence to support a finding that Commonwealth made a representation to Cape Trust in the telephone conversation between
Mr. Ribas and Mr. Hanks.
B.
The Acknowledgement which was contained
in the October 4, 1978 Assignment and which was
signed by Mr. Ralph Ribas of Commonwealth cannot,
as a matter of law, be held to constitute an
actionable misrepresentation.
Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning any possible representations made by Commonwealth to Cape Trust other
than the Acknowledgment which was contained in the October 4,
1978 Assignment and which was signed by Mr. Ribas on behalf of
Commonwealth.

Indeed, Mr. Hanks admitted during cross-examina-

tion at trial that the written Acknowledgement was the only
"representation" which Cape Trust claimed was made by Commonwealth regarding the status of the disputed subdivision lots
(Tr. p. 7 0) •
The Acknowledgement which was prepared by plaintiff and
signed by Mr. Ribas is not, and cannot be as a matter of law, a
representation regarding the status of the disputed subdivision
lots.

Rather, it is merely an acknowledgement and an agreement

which was signed by Mr. Ribas after the execution of the
Assignment.
The Acknowledgement signed by Mr. Ribas cannot be held to
be a representation by Commonwealth regarding the status of the
disputed subdivision lots for two reasons.

-11-
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ledgment states that Commonwealth "acknowledges receipt of an
executed copy" of the Assignment.

Thus, since the Assignment

had already been executed when Mr. Ribas signed the Acknowledgment, even if the Acknowledgement were to be considered as a
representation by Commonwealth, it would have been made after
the action by plaintiff which it supposedly induced.

It would

therefore have been impossible, as a matter of law, for the
Acknowledgement to have been a representation as to an existing
material fact, or, as discussed in pages 13-15 below, to have
been the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss.
The second reason the Acknowledgement cannot be held to be
an affirmative representation regarding the status of the disputed subdivision lots is that it is couched in terms of an
agreement, rather than as a statement or representation of certain facts.

The Acknowledgement provides:

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company also
agrees that it is in possession of the beneficial
interest of promissory notes and second trust deeds
covering the above-mentioned properties • • •
The Assignment specifying the specific promissory notes and
trust deeds covered thereby, and the Acknowledgment contained
therein, were prepared by plaintiff (Tr. p. 31) and should,
therefore, be construed against plaintiff.

The Acknowledgement

signed by Mr. Ribas was, by its own terms, merely an agreement
with the representations made by plaintiff in the Assignment
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regarding the status of the specific notes and trust deeds.

It

was not a statement of fact, nor was it a factual representation.

The Acknowledgment cannot, as a matter of law, therefore

be held to constitute an actionable misrepresentation.
Since there was no evidence at trial regarding a representation made by defendant to plaintiff with respect to the status of the five disputed subdivision lots, and since the Acknowledgment signed by Mr. Ribas on behalf of Commonwealth cannot, as a matter of law, be construed as an actionable misrepresentation of an existing fact, the finding that Commonwealth
made an actual representation to plaintiff regarding the status
of the five disputed subdivision lots is erroneous and the
judgment entered by the trial court should therefore be reversed.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN ITS CONCLUSION
OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF REASONABLY RELIED UPON
ANY REPRESENTATION MADE BY DEFENDANT.
A.
Plaintiff did not, as a matter of law, rely
upon any representation made by defendant with
respect to the status of the five disputed
subdivision lots.
To make out a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation, it was incumbent upon Cape Trust to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it actually relied upon the

-13-
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representation of defendant Commonwealth which it claims was
false.

This principle is summarized in 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud

and Deceit, § 223:
To be actionable a representation must have been
relied on at the time of the transaction or contract. Moreover, the representation must have been
the proximate cause of the representee's action or
change of position -- that is, it must have been
acted on in the manner contemplated by the party
making it or else in some manner reasonably probable.
Mr. Merlyn Hanks admitted on cross-examination that the
only representation which Cape Trust claimed was made by Cornrnonwealth with respect to the status of the five disputed
subdivision lots was the Acknowledgment contained in the
October 4, 1978, Assignment (Tr. pp. 16-17, 70), which document was drafted by Mr. Hanks (Tr. p. 31).

Since the Acknow-

ledgrnent was not prepared by Commonwealth, any representation
imputed to Commonwealth by virtue of the Acknowledgment must
have been made by the act of Mr. Ribas in signing the Acknowledgrnent.
In this regard it is important to note the opening language of the Acknowledgment, which states that Commonwealth
"hereby acknowledges receipt of an executed copy of the foregoing instrument."

Thus, when the Acknowledgment was signed

by Mr. Ribas and the "representation" of Commonwealth was
thus made, the Assignment had already been executed.

Indeed,

at one point during direct examination Mr. Hanks referred to
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the October 4, 1978 document as "the Assignment and subsequent Acknowledgment" (Tr. p. 17, line 13).

The representa-

tion therefore was not, as a matter of law, "relied on at the
time of the transaction or contract," and, consequently, was
not an actionable representation.
Further, the action which Cape Trust supposedly took in
reliance upon Commonwealth's representation was the execution
of the October 4 Assignment in satisfaction of a pre-existing
debt owed by AGLA.

However, as discussed above, this action

had already occurred when the Acknowledgment was signed by
Commonwealth.

Therefore, the signing of the Acknowledgment

by Commonwealth could not, as a matter of law, have been the
proximate cause of the actions of Cape Trust or of Cape
Trust's claimed damages.
B. Even if Cape Trust did rely upon a representation by Commonwealth, such reliance was unreasonable and unjustified on the part of Cape
Trust.
Even assuming that Commonwealth made an actual false representation to Cape Trust regarding the status of the five
disputed subdivision lots, and assuming that Cape Trust's
reliance upon such representation proximately caused it damage, it is essential in a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation that the person to whom such a false representation is made reasonably and justifiably relies thereon.
See,

~'

Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124
-15-
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(Utah 1982); Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952).

It

follows that one who has actual or constructive knowledge of
the falsity of facts represented to him cannot justifiably
rely upon those representations.

37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud and

Deceit, § 383 provides:
There are many defenses available in an action for
damages for fraud, some of which may be based upon
the absence in the case of one or more of the elements essential to the maintenance of such an action. Thus, the right of action may be negatived
on the ground • • • that the complainant had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual
facts.
This general rule as it applies to fraud actions, and by
inference to actions based upon negligent misrepresentation,
is summarized in Section 541 of the Second Restatement of
Torts as follows:
The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is
not justified in relying upon its truth if he knows
that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him.
In this case, Mr. Hanks, trustee for Cape Trust, and the
one who prepared the Assignment of promissory notes and trust
deeds from AGLA to Cape Trust, testified that in his role as
treasurer of Capitol he would have seen and negotiated the
April 12, 1978 check (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4) payable to
Capitol which specified on its face that it represented lot
payoffs on the five disputed lots.

Thus, Cape Trust had ac-

tual knowledge, imputed to it through Mr. Hanks, of the fact
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that the five disputed trust deeds and notes which they secured had been reconveyed and satisfied, and it could not
justifiably rely upon any representations to the contrary by
Commonwealth.
Further, certified copies of deeds of reconveyance which
were recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on
the five disputed subdivision lots were introduced and received into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit D-5.

These re-

conveyances were of record in the County Recorder's office at
the time the assignment from AGLA to Cape Trust was prepared
by Mr. Hanks and executed.

Utah Code Annotated

§

57-3-2,

provides:
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this
title • • • shall, from the time of filing the same
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all
persons of the contents thereof: • • •
Cape Trust therefore had constructive knowledge of the fact
that the trust deeds on the five disputed subdivision lots
had been reconveyed prior to the preparation and execution of
the Assignment, and it could not, therefore, justifiably rely
upon representations by Commonwealth to the contrary.
Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, supra, was an action
for the misrepresentation of the square footage in a house.
In Mikkelson the defendant, a real estate agent, listed a
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house for sale indicating that it contained 2800 square
feet.

The house was purchased by the plaintiff, and an FHA

appraisal was obtained which indicated that the square footage was actually 2,394 square feet.

The plaintiff signed the

closing documents after having acknowledged receipt of the
FHA appraisal information.
In preparing to sell the house one year later, the plaintiff measured the square footage and discovered the discrepancy.

The trial court found an actionable misrepresentation

on the part of the defendant real estate agent and awarded
damages to the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court reversed the

lower court, holding that the plaintiff did not reasonably
rely upon the representation of defendant as to the square
footage of the house.

The court stated, at page 126:

The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff
could not have reasonably relied on his belief that
the house contained 2800 square feet since he not
only inspected the property but also signed, prior
to closing, loan documents acknowledging receipt of
the FHA appraisal report wherein the correct footage was revealed. Furthermore, on cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that he had in his file
and possession a copy of the form containing the
correct figure. While plaintiff may have initially
received false information, he cannot reasonably
continue to rely on it once true and correct information is furnished him, particularly when the corrected information is contained in a document of
the importance and dignity of an appraisal and related forms.
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As in the Mikkelson case, Mr. Hanks here testified that
he most likely saw and negotiated the check which indicated
on its face that it represented lot pay-offs on the five disputed subdivision lots prior to preparing the Assignment of
the beneficial interests which contained those five subdivision lots (Tr. pp. 13,33).

Cape Trust was, therefore, not

justified as a matter of law in relying upon any representation by Commonwealth regarding the status of the five disputed subdivision lots where it knew, or should have known,
of the true status of those lots.
In Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954), the plaintiff sued to forfeit a real estate contract and retake possession of a motel.

The defendants filed a counterclaim al-

leging that in connection with the sale of the motel the
plaintiff misrepresented the motel's gross income.

The trial

court ruled in favor of the defendants on the misrepresentation issue.
In the Lewis case, despite the fact that the defendants
were naive and were entirely without business experience, and
were relying upon the plaintiff's knowledge and expertise as
a real estate broker and motel operator, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the misrepresentation issue.

The Supreme Court held, at page 866:

-19-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In submitting the question of fraud it was incumbent upon the trial court to instruct the jury as
to the elements necessary to establish it. Plaintiffs point out that he failed to do this in that
he did not tell them that in order to establish
their claim of fraud defendants must have reasonably relied upon the representations they claim the
plaintiff made to them. This is invariably held to
be an element necessary to make out a case of
fraud. No matter how naive or inexperienced the
defendants were, they could not close their eyes
and accept unquestioningly any representations made
to them. It was their duty to make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate.
[Emphasis in original]
See, also, Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 {Utah
1981); and Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 423 P.2d 659
{Utah 1967) , in which the Utah Supreme Court held:
One who complains of being injured by such a
false representation cannot heedlessly accept as
true whatever is told him, but has the duty of
exercising such degree of care to protect his
own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to account for
the consequences of his own neglect.
The undisputed evidence at trial established that plaintiff Cape Trust had actual and constructive knowledge of the
fact that the five disputed promissory notes and trust deeds
had been satisfied and reconveyed prior to the assignment of
those notes and trust deeds from AGLA to Cape Trust.

Cape

Trust was therefore not justified, as a matter of law, in
relying upon any contrary representations made by Commonwealth.

Further, plaintiff Cape Trust was not justified in
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blindlessly and heedlessly accepting as true anything which
Commonwealth might have represented concerning the disputed
lots.

POINT III
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO CAPE TRUST.
A. The $21,680 awarded as damages was unsupported
by competent evidence, and was wrong as a matter of law.
Following trial the court awarded plaintiff damages in
the amount of $21,680 plus interest at the rate of 10% per
annum from October 7, 1977 to April 7, 1978 and 18% interest
thereafter until the date of judgment.

This award of damages

was excessive as a matter of law, and was not supported by
the evidence.
Mr. Merlyn Hanks testified that the amount of debt owed
by AGLA which was forgiven by Cape Trust in return for the
assignment of the beneficial interest in the promissory notes
and trust deeds on the disputed lots was based upon some type
of present value formula or analysis (Tr. pp. 18, 26,
30-31) •

There was no testimony or evidence offered to ex-

plain the present value formula or analysis so used.
Mr. Hanks testified on cross-examination that the present
value formula utilized by Cape Trust resulted in some discounting of the face value of the promissory notes involved
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(Tr. p. 27).

However, Mr. Hanks did not testify as to the

amount of discounting which occurred.

Indeed, he testified

on cross-examination that a calculation of the discounting
which occurred could not be made from the evidence in the
record:

Q.
So you applied the present value of the
face amount of 40% of whatever the lot prices
were?
A.
Not the present value of the face amount.
present value of the anticipated payoff.

Q.

The

From the date the notes bore?

A.
Yes.
To the date that we anticipated they
would payoff.

Q.

Well, what was the date you anticipated they
would payoff?

A.
Without that document that I referred to having received from AGLA, I can't give you that
date.
It was different, however, than the date of
the maturity because AGLA Development, in its relationship with the builders, you know, to whom
they had sold the lots wanted us to be a little
more lenient with the time than the notes called
for.
That's why it took some additional calculation to determine what the anticipated amount would
be.

Q.
So without some further evidence in the record
you can't specifically tell us what date you utilized in your present value calculations in order to
determine the amount that was actually credited
against the AGLA debt; is that correct?
A.

That's right.

Transcript, pages 30-31.
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Mr. Hanks testified further under cross-examination
that the $21,680 prayed for in the complaint represented the face value of the notes, not taking into account
the discounting which occurred (Tr. p. 27).

Thus, he

testified that the actual amount of damages sustained
by Cape Trust was not the amount prayed for in the complaint.

There was no testimony or evidence regarding

the amount of damage actually sustained by plaintiff.
Further, paragraph 14 of the Findings of Fact entered by the court, upon which the award of damages was
based, states:
That the five promissory notes the Trust Deeds on
Lots 12, 18, 30, 34 and 53, Falconhurst Subdivision
No. 1, were all executed October 7, 1977 and the
original total principal amount of the five notes
was the sum of $21,680, together with interest for
six months at 10% per annum and thereafter at 18%
per annum.
Mr. Hanks was allowed to testify regarding the terms of
the promissory notes despite objections by defendant under
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence that the best evidence
of the terms of the notes would be the notes themselves,
which were not offered as evidence (Tr. p. 19).

Since the

testimony contained in the transcript on pages 20-23 concerning the terms and contents of the disputed promissory notes
should not have been admitted because of the Best Evidence
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Rule, the award of damages based upon such testimony was
error and cannot stand as a matter of law.
B. The pre-judgment interest awarded plaintiff by the trial court was unsupported by the evidence, and was wrong as a matter of law since it
represented special damages which were neither
pleaded nor proved by plaintiff.
The pre-judgment interest awarded by the trial court is
also clearly in error.

There was no contract between plain-

tiff and defendant which provided for the interest rate
awarded by the court.

There is no Utah statute which autho-

rizes such an award of interest.
The amount of interest which was awarded to plaintiff is
an element of special damages.

See, Cohn v. J.

Company, Inc., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975).

c.

Penney

As such, it was

error to award that amount of interest since it was not specially pleaded or prayed for by plaintiff.

Special damages,

in order to be awarded, must be specifically pleaded and
prayed for by plaintiff Id.

The prayer of plaintiff's com-

plaint reads:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against Commonwealth and AGLA, jointly and severally, in the amount of $21,680, together with interest thereon
from the date such funds were paid by Commonwealth
to others to the date of judgment herein, and for
plaintiff's costs incurred herein.
It is clear that plaintiff did not plead nor pray for the
special rate of interest which was awarded.
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Not only did plaintiff not plead or pray for the special
interest award, but plaintiff failed to prove by competent
evidence that it was entitled to such an award of interest.
Indeed, the only evidence at trial indicating that plaintiff
suffered a loss of the specified amount of interest awarded
was the testimony by Mr. Hanks concerning the terms of promissory notes which were not introduced into evidence.

As

discussed above, such testimony should have been excluded
based upon the Best Evidence Rule.

Thus, the interest award-

ed was wrong as a matter of law, and was totally unsupported
by admissible evidence.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding that Commonwealth made
an affirmative representation to Cape Trust regarding the
status of the five disputed subdivision lots, and in finding
that Cape Trust reasonably relied upon any possible representation of Commonwealth.

The trial court further erred in

awarding Cape Trust an amount of damages which finds no support in the evidence and which plaintiff admitted was not the
amount of damages actually sustained by plaintiff, and in
awarding plaintiff a pre-judgment rate of interest which represents an award of special damages which was neither
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pleaded nor proved by plaintiff.

It is therefore respectful-

ly submitted that the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed and judgment should be entered in favor of defendant, Commonwealth
DATED this

/3

~d

Title Insurance Company.

day of May, 1982.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Company
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